✅ 4.2 Product-related essential requirements (Annex I, Part I)

Product-related essential cybersecurity requirements

4.2.1 Which technical measures does a manufacturer need to implement?

The CRA establishes a set of essential cybersecurity requirements relating to the properties of products with digital elements. Such requirements are objective-oriented and technology-neutral and apply horizontally to all products with digital elements.

The specific technical implementation of the essential requirements is dependent on the cybersecurity risk assessment that each manufacturer is required to undertake and take into account during the planning, design, development, production, delivery and maintenance phases of the product with digital elements, in accordance with Article 13(12). For further information on the risk assessment, see the section 4.1 Risk-based approach and risk-assessment.

The manufacturer is required to detail in its technical documentation the means used to ensure that the product complies with the essential cybersecurity requirements, including instances where certain essential cybersecurity requirements are not applicable to the product with digital elements, in accordance with Article 13(4).

In order to facilitate the assessment of conformity with the essential requirements, the Commission adopted a standardisation request addressed to CEN, CENELEC and ETSI (the European Standardisation Organisations), requesting the development of harmonised standards in the technical areas covered by the CRA.

The CRA Standardisation Request requests, inter alia, the development of horizontal harmonised standards covering the product-related essential requirements laid down in Annex I, Part I of the CRA, with a view to support “(i) the development of further, granular vertical harmonised standards for specific products or product types, and (ii) [to] support manufacturers in defining and implementing the security requirements applicable to their respective products, including particularly for products not covered by existing or planned vertical standards” (Annex II, section 2.1 of CRA SR). For more information, see 6.10 When will harmonised standards to support CRA compliance be ready?

It should be noted that the use of harmonised standards is voluntary. Manufacturers may demonstrate conformity with the essential requirements via other technical means and are required to document them in their technical documentation.

© 2025 European Union • CC-BY 4.0“FAQs on the Cyber Resilience Act” p.34–35 (PDF)
Disclaimer

Disclaimer: This document is prepared by the Commission services and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position. The replies to the FAQs do not extend in any way the rights and obligations deriving from applicable legislation nor introduce any additional requirement. The expressed views are not authoritative and cannot prejudge any future actions the European Commission may take, including potential positions before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is competent to authoritatively interpret Union law.

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4.2.2 How can a manufacturer ensure that a product is free from all vulnerabilities?

On the basis of the cybersecurity risk assessment referred to in Article 13(2) and where applicable, products with digital elements shall […] be made available on the market without known exploitable vulnerabilities (Annex I, Essential requirement (2)(a))

‘vulnerability’ means a weakness, susceptibility or flaw of a product with digital elements that can be exploited by a cyber threat (Article 3(40)

‘exploitable vulnerability’ means a vulnerability that has the potential to be effectively used by an adversary under practical operational conditions (Article 3(41)

The CRA does not require manufacturers to ensure that a product is free from all vulnerabilities.

The CRA requires manufacturers, at the moment of placement on the market, to ensure that, on the basis of their cybersecurity risk assessment and where applicable, the product does not contain known exploitable vulnerabilities.

In fact, not all vulnerabilities are exploitable under practical operational conditions. Some vulnerabilities can only be exploited in theoretical conditions (e.g. in a lab or in a simulation) and/or not under conditions which would occur in the operational environment of a given product with digital elements. Whether a vulnerability is exploitable needs to be addressed on a case-by-case basis, depending on the specific operational and technical conditions, including for example the extent to which the vulnerable code is invoked or loaded when the product is in use; the level and type of access required to carry out the exploit; whether compensating controls are already in place to mitigate exploitation.

For example, a smartphone may have a vulnerability that would enable an attacker to bypass security (e.g. skipping password checks); but in order to achieve this, the attacker needs physical access to the device and invasive physical tampering (e.g. using of a laser to cause a glitch) to make use of the exploit. On the basis of its risk assessment, the manufacturer may conclude that this would not be considered an exploitable vulnerability because it could not reasonably be exploited in practical operational conditions.

© 2025 European Union • CC-BY 4.0“FAQs on the Cyber Resilience Act” p.35–36 (PDF)
Disclaimer

Disclaimer: This document is prepared by the Commission services and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position. The replies to the FAQs do not extend in any way the rights and obligations deriving from applicable legislation nor introduce any additional requirement. The expressed views are not authoritative and cannot prejudge any future actions the European Commission may take, including potential positions before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is competent to authoritatively interpret Union law.

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4.2.3 How should manufacturers deal with known exploitable vulnerabilities discovered after a product has been placed on the market but before reaching its final user?

Products with digital elements may be placed on the market and enter the distribution chain some time before they reach their final user. This is often the case, for example, when a product is sent to the distribution branch of a manufacturer; or it is offered for sale online or through other means of distance selling and is transferred to fulfilment service providers for delivery, reaching its final user days or months after placement on the market. For example, a laptop may stay on the shelf of an electronics shop for some time before being reaching its user.

In the period between placement on the market and transaction to the intended final user, known exploitable vulnerabilities affecting that product may be discovered. However, the obligation to deliver, on the basis of the risk assessment, products without known exploitable vulnerabilities applies at the moment of placement on the market (Article 13(1)). As the product has already been placed on the market, manufacturers are therefore not expected to fix newly discovered vulnerabilities while their products have not yet reached their user.

Nonetheless, as the CRA also establishes vulnerability handling requirements that apply during a product’s support period, manufacturers shall, in relation to the risks posed to products with digital elements, address and remediate vulnerabilities without delay, in accordance with Annex I, Part II, point (2). For example, given the risks posed by the newly discovered exploitable vulnerabilities, the laptop manufacturer establishes that a security update is necessary to address those vulnerabilities. The manufacturer may be required to provide a security update for the laptop, as soon as it is put into operation by its user.

© 2025 European Union • CC-BY 4.0“FAQs on the Cyber Resilience Act” p.36 (PDF)
Disclaimer

Disclaimer: This document is prepared by the Commission services and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position. The replies to the FAQs do not extend in any way the rights and obligations deriving from applicable legislation nor introduce any additional requirement. The expressed views are not authoritative and cannot prejudge any future actions the European Commission may take, including potential positions before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is competent to authoritatively interpret Union law.

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4.2.4 How does the secure-by-default requirement work?

On the basis of the cybersecurity risk assessment referred to in Article 13(2) and where applicable, products with digital elements shall: […] be made available on the market with a secure by default configuration, unless otherwise agreed between manufacturer and business user in relation to a tailor-made product with digital elements, including the possibility to reset the product to its original state (Annex I, Part I, point 2(b)).

Manufacturers are required to place products with digital elements on the market with a secure by default configuration, in light of that product’s intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use, and on the basis of the manufacturer’s cybersecurity risk assessment.

Where manufacturers place on the market a component for integration into another product with digital elements, they do not retain control on how the integrating manufacturer adjusts the component’s configuration. The obligation to ensure a secure-by-default configuration, therefore, only applies to the component when it is placed on the market separately, and not to how it is later configured or deployed by integrating manufacturers.

For example, the manufacturer of a cryptographic library may be required, on the basis of its risk assessment, to place that library on the market with insecure or deprecated algorithms disabled by default, or certificate validation enabled by default. The integrating manufacturer may decide to change some of those settings when developing its own product with digital elements. The manufacturer of the cryptographic library is only responsible for the configuration that the library is delivered with, and not for subsequent modifications that its integrator makes.

Similarly, the manufacturer of a microcontroller with a built-in network stack may be required, on the basis of its risk assessment, to place the microcontroller on the market with the network interfaces disabled by default. The integrating manufacturer may then decide to enable them to meet its own product’s intended purpose. The manufacturer of the microcontroller is only responsible for the configuration that the microcontroller is delivered with, and not for subsequent modifications that its integrator makes.

For further information on exceptions to the secure-by-default configuration, see entry 4.2.5 When is a product “tailor-made”? What documentation is required in these cases?

Finally, it is possible that this essential requirement is not applicable to some products with digital elements. Entry 4.1.3 Does a manufacturer need to implement all the essential requirements? provides further guidance on this.

© 2025 European Union • CC-BY 4.0“FAQs on the Cyber Resilience Act” p.36–37 (PDF)
Disclaimer

Disclaimer: This document is prepared by the Commission services and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position. The replies to the FAQs do not extend in any way the rights and obligations deriving from applicable legislation nor introduce any additional requirement. The expressed views are not authoritative and cannot prejudge any future actions the European Commission may take, including potential positions before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is competent to authoritatively interpret Union law.

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4.2.5 When is a product “tailor-made”? What documentation is required in these cases?

Manufacturers should make their products with digital elements available on the market with a secure by default configuration and provide security updates to users free of charge. Manufacturers should only be able to deviate from the essential cybersecurity requirements in relation to tailor-made products that are fitted to a particular purpose for a particular business user and where both the manufacturer and the user have explicitly agreed to a different set of contractual terms (Recital 64).

The CRA establishes that manufacturers may deviate from two essential requirements (namely, secure by default configuration in point (2.b) of Annex I, Part I and providing security updates to users free of charge in point (8) of Annex I, Part II) in relation to tailor-made products that are fitted to a particular purpose for a particular business user and where both the manufacturer and the user have explicitly agreed to a different set of contractual terms, as stated in the aforementioned points of Annex I, Part I.

This could be the case, for example, for custom-developed hardware or software designed to meet the needs of a specific business user, or products that are developed for integration into a specific customer’s highly controlled environments (e.g. closed networks or air-gapped environments) and are subject to specific contractual terms.

A product is not tailor-made, on the other hand, when it undergoes minor customisations before being sold to a customer, without specific sets of contractual terms or arrangements. This is the case, for example, for a customer relationship management (CRM) platform sold to multiple businesses, even if the manufacturer enables some minor customisations; or platforms that use plugins or APIs to be customised, but are fundamentally the same product for every customer.

In accordance with Article 31, the manufacturer is expected to include in its technical documentation all relevant data or details to show that its product complies with the relevant essential cybersecurity requirements, including appropriate evidence to demonstrate that the product is tailor-made.

© 2025 European Union • CC-BY 4.0“FAQs on the Cyber Resilience Act” p.37–38 (PDF)
Disclaimer

Disclaimer: This document is prepared by the Commission services and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position. The replies to the FAQs do not extend in any way the rights and obligations deriving from applicable legislation nor introduce any additional requirement. The expressed views are not authoritative and cannot prejudge any future actions the European Commission may take, including potential positions before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is competent to authoritatively interpret Union law.

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