What level of due diligence is reasonable for manufacturers integrating open source components?

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The reasonable level of due diligence for an open source component depends on the nature and level of cybersecurity risk of that component, as for any other third-party component. The Commission's FAQ says so: "the appropriate level of due diligence is dependent on the nature and level of cybersecurity risk of a given open-source component" (How should manufacturers exercise due diligence with regards to open-source components that are not subject to the CRA?, What is the appropriate level of due diligence?). You may integrate open source components outside the scope of the CRA, or published by an open-source software steward, as long as they do not compromise the cybersecurity of your product (How should manufacturers exercise due diligence with regards to open-source components that are not subject to the CRA?, Article 13(5) of the CRA).

What due diligence involves, and the actions Recital 34 of the CRA lists to choose from, such as the component's security update history, known vulnerabilities in public databases and your own tests, is covered in What is due diligence? (What is the appropriate level of due diligence?). The Commission's guidance sums up the exercise as working out what your product needs from the component and verifying that it delivers it (Guidance point 171).

If you find a vulnerability in the component, you have to report it to whoever maintains it, through the channels the project publishes, fix it in your product, and share any fix you develop with them (CRA Article 13(6), Guidance points 223 and 226). A project with no contact address or no maintainer does not lower your obligations for your own product: the guidance says you need not report upstream "where the component no longer has a maintainer", but should inform its users another way (Guidance point 225), and the Commission's FAQ says that where the project is "not supporting the manufacturer in addressing and remediating vulnerabilities", you address them yourself, by disabling the function, switching components or patching the component (How should vulnerabilities in integrated components be addressed and remediated?).

The CRA also lets the Commission set up voluntary security attestation programmes for open source software, which the Commission's FAQ says "would facilitate manufacturers' due diligence obligation" where available (Article 25 of the CRA, How should manufacturers exercise due diligence with regards to open-source components that are not subject to the CRA?): see How are security attestations and due diligence related?.

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