What is reasonably foreseeable misuse, and how does it affect the cybersecurity risk assessment?

In accordance with Article 13(18), the manufacturer should provide information to the users regarding the expected conditions for secure deployment and integration of the product. On their part, user should take into consideration the lawful conditions of use of the product defined by the manufacturer, provided these are reasonable and appropriate to the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use, in particular where low-skilled or vulnerable users are concerned. Article 3(24) defines ‘reasonably foreseeable misuse’ as the use of a product with digital elements in a way that is not in accordance with its intended purpose, but which may result from reasonably foreseeable human behaviour or interaction with other systems. For instance, if the information and instructions to the user mentions that the product must be deployed on a secure network, deploying it on an insecure network might constitute a reasonably foreseeable misuse. Similarly, although some users might be hacking their devices for fun (or for security research), this use is not necessarily in line with the manufacturer’s

stated intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use, and therefore would constitute a form of misuse.[1]

Furthermore, manufacturers shall ensure that products with digital elements are accompanied by the information and instructions to the user set out in Annex II, including any known or foreseeable circumstance, related to the use of the product with digital elements in accordance with its intended purpose or under conditions of reasonably foreseeable misuse, which may lead to significant cybersecurity risks. Risks concerning reasonably foreseeable misuse must also be communicated in the information and instructions to the user. For instance, where the information and instructions to the user mentions that the product must be deployed on a secure network, this implies that the manufacturer may not have covered certain risks emerging from use on insecure networks. The manufacturer should therefore inform the user wherever such reasonably foreseeable misuse may still lead to significant cybersecurity risks.


  1. As stated in Recital 75, Member States should aim to address, to the extent possible, the challenges faced by vulnerability researchers, including their potential exposure to criminal liability, in accordance with national law. Given that natural and legal persons researching vulnerabilities could in some Member States be exposed to criminal and civil liability, Member States are encouraged to adopt guidelines as regards the non-prosecution of information security researchers and an exemption from civil liability for their activities. ↩︎

© 2025 European Union • CC-BY 4.0“FAQs on the Cyber Resilience Act” p.30–31 (PDF)
Disclaimer

Disclaimer: This document is prepared by the Commission services and should not be considered as representative of the European Commission’s official position. The replies to the FAQs do not extend in any way the rights and obligations deriving from applicable legislation nor introduce any additional requirement. The expressed views are not authoritative and cannot prejudge any future actions the European Commission may take, including potential positions before the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is competent to authoritatively interpret Union law.